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Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n: The Court Legalizes Sports 
Gambling, but Constitutional 
Questions Remain 
JOSEPH STIERS* 
In Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,1 the 
Supreme Court held the Professional and Amateur Sports 
Protection act of 1992 (PASPA) violated the anti-
commandeering doctrine under the Tenth Amendment for 
prohibiting the modification or repeal of state-law 
restrictions on private conduct.2 The decision added yet 
another exception to the list of anti-commandeering drafting 
rules formed out of New York v. United States3 and Printz v. 
United States.4 Murphy abrogated PASPA, resulting in the 
legalization of sports gambling under federal law.5   
The outcome of this case was a major victory for the 
gambling industry and presents an extraordinary instance of 
judicial legislation.6 Unlike New York and Printz, where a 
relatively minor portion of the statute was severed,7 the 
Murphy Court elected to abrogate all of PASPA.8 Although 
Congress could redraft a version of PASPA prohibiting sports 
gambling without commandeering the states, the current 
* Joseph Stiers, J. BUS. & TECH. L.
1 Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
2 Id. at 1473-74.
3 505 U.S. 144, 145 (1992).
4 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
5 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484.
6 See infra Part IV.B.
7 See infra Part II.A.
8 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484.
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Congress is unlikely to address an apolitical issue from 
twenty-six years ago.9 As a result, the Supreme Court 
effectively legalized sports gambling across America.10   
While this decision acted as a remedy for New Jersey 
and other states regarding sports gambling, the anti-
commandeering doctrine does not address the more relevant 
question of whether the federal government can impose 
regulations on some states while exempting others.11 Murphy 
did not remedy the critical flaw of PASPA, which was 
designed to stop the “spread of sports gambling” by allowing 
states that previously authorized sports gambling to 
maintain such laws, while barring future states from 
participation.12 This question was addressed under the 
“doctrine of equal sovereignty of the states” by the Third 
Circuit in 2013,13 but not discussed by the Supreme Court, 
leaving the issue unresolved.14 In the future, laws that grant 
certain states economic advantages over others will need to 
be addressed on equal sovereignty grounds.15   
 
I. THE CASE 
 
On December 8, 2011, the New Jersey Legislature amended 
the New Jersey Constitution to permit sports gambling in 
                                               
9 See infra note 173 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra Part IV.B. 
11 See infra Part IV.C. 
12 Id. 
13 See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (stating that the petitioners should have challenged the 
validity of the grandfathering provision, rather than PASPA’s general 
prohibition of sports gambling).   
14 Christie v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 189 L. Ed. 2d 806, cert. 
denied 134 S. Ct. 2866, (2014). 
15 See infra Part IV.C; Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of New 
Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 237 (3d Cir. 2013); Nw. Austin Mun. Utility Dist. 
No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009); Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 
S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 STIERS 
Journal of Business & Technology Law 137 
Atlantic City casinos and New Jersey racetracks.16 
Subsequently, the legislature amended the Casino Control 
Act to allow sports wagering.17 On August 7, 2012, the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) filed a 
complaint,18 claiming that the Sports Wagering Law violated 
the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 
(PASPA).19 PASPA prohibited states and individuals from 
sponsoring, operating, advertising, promoting, licensing, or 
authorizing any form of gambling on competitive games 
involving amateur or professional athletes.20 When PASPA 
was enacted, Congress provided a one-year window for states 
which operated licensed casinos to authorize sports 
wagering, but New Jersey declined to enact sports-wagering 
laws at that time.21 
In February 2013, the U.S. District Court for the 
District of New Jersey held that PASPA was constitutional 
and preempted New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law.22 The 
court granted a permanent injunction against New Jersey’s 
Sports Wagering Law.23 New Jersey appealed and the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the 
decision in Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of New 
Jersey (hereinafter, Christie I), holding that PASPA did not 
violate the anti-commandeering principle under the Tenth 
                                               
16 N.J. CONST., art. IV, sec. VII, paras. 2(D), (F). 
17 N.J.S.A. 5:12A-1 et seq. (2011). 
18 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 553 
(D.N.J.), aff'd sub nom., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of 
N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013). 
19 PASPA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704 (2012). 
20 Id. § 3702. 
21 Id. § 3704. 
22 See Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 554 (holding that the Government had 
a rational basis for PASPA, and that PASPA did not violate the Tenth 
Amendment). 
23 Id. at 578. 
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Amendment.24 The Third Circuit also held that the principle 
of equal sovereignty was insufficient grounds to invalidate 
PASPA.25 In the majority opinion, Judge Fuentes rejected the 
anti-commandeering claim because PASPA did not force 
states to take an affirmative action, but added that the 
prevention of a state's right to repeal its own laws would 
violate the anti-commandeering doctrine.26 New Jersey 
petitioned for certiorari and was denied.27 
In response to Judge Fuentes’ opinion, the New Jersey 
State Senate enacted Senate Bill 2250, partially repealing 
the state’s existing prohibitions on sports gambling, but only 
allowing sports wagering at licensed casinos and 
racetracks.28 Governor Christie vetoed the bill, claiming it 
was an “attempt to circumvent the Third Circuit’s Ruling . . 
.[.]”29 On October 17, 2014, Governor Christie changed 
positions and signed Senate Bill 2460, repealing New 
Jersey’s prohibition on sports wagering.30 The repeal stated 
provisions, which only allowed sports wagering at casinos 
and racetracks.31   
Following the 2014 Law, the NCAA again sued New 
Jersey on the grounds that the new law was preempted by 
PASPA.32 The district court held the 2014 Law was 
                                               
24 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 
237 (3d Cir. 2013). 
25 Id. at 239. 
26 Id. at 232. 
27 Christie v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 S. Ct. 2866, 189 L. Ed. 
2d 806 (2014) (cert. denied). 
28 S. 2250, 216th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2014) (vetoed). 
29 Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 2016 WL 7321803 (U.S.), 9 
(Brief opposing cert.). 
30 S. 2460, 216th Leg. (N.J. 2014). 
31 Id. 
32 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 492 
(D.N.J. 2014), aff'd sub nom. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor 
of New Jersey, 799 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015), reh'g en banc granted, opinion 
vacated (Oct. 14, 2015), on reh'g en banc, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016), and 
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preempted by PASPA33 and the Amateur and Professional 
Sports Leagues were entitled to permanent injunction.34 New 
Jersey appealed and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the district court's decision, noting, “[t]he presence 
of the word ‘repeal’ does not prevent us from examining what 
the provision actually does, [which] . . . does not change the 
fact that the 2014 Law selectively grants permission to 
certain entities to engage in sports gambling.”35 Judge 
Fuentes dissented, standing by his original opinion from 
Christie I, that PASPA’s prohibition of a state-law repeal 
violated the anti-commandeering doctrine within the Tenth 
Amendment.36 In August 2016, the case was reheard, en 
banc, and the Third Circuit affirmed that New Jersey’s 2014 
Law effectively authorized sports gambling by specific 
entities, in violation of PASPA.37 New Jersey petitioned for 
certiorari, which was granted on June 27, 2017.38 The 
Supreme Court consolidated Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass'n with New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen's 
                                               
aff'd sub nom. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of N.J., 832 
F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016). 
33 Id. at 506. 
34 Id. at 508. 
35 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of New Jersey, 799 F.3d 259, 
266 (3d Cir. 2015), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Oct. 14, 2015), 
on reh'g en banc, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom. New 
Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass'n, 137 S. Ct. 2326 (2017), and cert. granted sub nom. Christie v. Nat'l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (2017). 
36 Id. at 271 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).   
37 See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of New Jersey, 832 F.3d 
389, 396-402 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom. New Jersey 
Thoroughbred Horsemen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 
137 S. Ct. 2326 (2017), and cert. granted sub nom. Murphy v. Nat'l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (2017). 
38 Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (2017) (cert. 
granted). 
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Ass'n v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n39 to answer the 
question of whether a PASPA unconstitutionally 
commandeered the regulatory power of the states by 
prohibiting the repeal of state law.40  
 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
The Tenth Amendment states, “[t]he powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”41 For most of the modern era, the Tenth Amendment 
acted as little more than a declaratory relationship between 
the states and national government.42 In 1992, the Court 
shifted gears, invalidating an environmental regulation on 
Tenth Amendment grounds for commandeering states to 
enforce federal law in New York v. United States.43 The anti-
commandeering doctrine was reinforced five years later in 
Printz v. United States,44 but remained narrow in scope.45 In 
similarly surprising fashion, the equal sovereignty doctrine 
recently emerged in Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder.46 The unique 
structure of PASPA has raised both anti-commandeering and 
equal sovereignty questions.47  
                                               
39 N.J. Thoroughbred Horsemen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass'n, 137 S. Ct. 824 (2017). 
40 Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
41 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
42 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
43 505 U.S. 144, 188, (1992). 
44 See 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (ruling that a portion of the Brady Act 
conscripting state law enforcement officers to assist in carrying out the 
federal law was unconstitutional commandeering under the Tenth 
Amendment). 
45 See Christie I, 730 F.3d at 231 (“[S]tatutes prohibiting the states from 
taking certain actions have never been struck down even if they require 
the expenditure of some time and effort or the modification or 
invalidation of contrary state laws.”). 
46 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
47 See Christie I, 730 F.3d at 231-40. 
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Section II.A conveys the history of the Tenth 
Amendment and the emergence of the anti-commandeering 
doctrine in New York v. United States and Printz v. United 
States. Section II.B examines the equal sovereignty principle.  
Section II.C discusses the political conditions leading up to 
New Jersey’s challenge of PASPA and the implications of 
interstate politics on federal law. 
 
A. New York and Printz rewrite the Tenth 
Amendment: The emergence of the anti-
commandeering doctrine.  
 
The modern anti-commandeering doctrine formed out of New 
York v. United States, but anti-commandeering principles 
date back to 1842 in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.48 In Prigg, the 
Supreme Court held that the states cannot be compelled to 
enforce national law and it “might” be unconstitutional for 
the national government to compel states to carry out federal 
duties.49 Subsequently, other cases upheld this language, but 
only when a law directly forced states to act affirmatively.50 
During the twentieth century, the Court rarely considered 
Tenth Amendment challenges, given the Federal 
Government’s enumerated rights to preempt state law, 
within the Commerce51 and the Supremacy Clauses.52   
The Federal Government regularly coerces states to 
comply with federal regulations via preemption under the 
Supremacy Clause or via federal spending powers.53 
                                               
48 Prigg v. Com. of Pa., 41 U.S. 539 (1842). 
49 Id. at 615-16. 
50 See, e.g., Com. of Ky. v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66, 109-10 (1860), overruled 
by Puerto Rico v Branstad, 483 US 219 (1987).  
51 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
52 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
53 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 145 (outlining traditional 
methods Congress uses to coerce states into complying with federal 
regulations). 
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Therefore, Congress need not create laws that expressly 
mandate affirmative enforcement by state officials.54 In New 
York v. United States, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Policy Act55 provided three compliance incentives. The third 
incentive acted more like a mandate—forcing states to take 
possession of radioactive waste.56 The Court in New York, 
relied heavily on dicta from FERC v. Mississippi,57 and Hodel 
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.58 to 
determine that a Tenth Amendment limitation existed on 
Congress’s power to commandeer states.59 At the time of New 
York v. United States, anti-commandeering under the Tenth 
Amendment was relatively unprecedented.60 The Court even 
cited an unusual 1911 opinion61 in search of affirmative 
support.62 The Supreme Court did not intend to overrule 
centuries of precedent supporting federal preemption, but 
rather carved out a narrow exception, barring the Federal 
Government from compelling state legislatures to enforce 
federal law.63 
This exception broadened in Printz, where the Court 
invalidated a provision of the Brady Act64 requiring state law 
                                               
54 See id. 
55 Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, PUB. L. NO. 96–573, 
94 Stat. 3347 (1980). 
56 New York, 505 U.S. at 169. 
57 456 U.S. 742, 758-59 (1982). 
58 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981). 
59 New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69. 
60 Although New York relied on dicta from Hodel and Ferc, both of those 
cases ultimately upheld federal preemption. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 749; 
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288. 
61 Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).  The Court in Coyle discussed the 
equal sovereignty requirement for new states admitted to the union, but 
also held that Federal statute could not prevent a state from relocating 
its capital under the Tenth Amendment. Id. 
62 New York, 505 U.S. at 162 (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. at 565). 
63 New York, 505 U.S. at 179. 
64 The Brady Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012). 
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enforcement officers to take part in background checks for 
gun purchasers.65 In Printz, the Court additionally ruled that 
Congress cannot circumvent the holding from New York, by 
“conscripting the State’s officers directly.”66 
While the anti-commandeering doctrine expanded in 
Printz, the Supreme Court had not struck down any federal 
laws on commandeering grounds post-Printz.67 Congress 
properly reacted to the rulings in New York and Printz and 
carefully developed subsequent regulations to avoid actively 
commandeering state officials.68 The constitutionality of 
conditional spending and preemption maintains 
overwhelmingly precedential support.69 Further, in Reno v. 
Condon,70 the Supreme Court relied on South Carolina v. 
Baker,71 distinguishing New York and Printz, and 
significantly narrowing the scope of the anti-commandeering 
doctrine.72 In Condon, the Court acknowledged that the 
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act did burden state officials with 
                                               
65 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
66 Id. 
67 See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150 (narrowing the precedential 
scope of New York and Printz). 
68 See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 542 (2012). 
While this case involved a Tenth Amendment issue of excessive use of 
federal spending powers, the drafters of the Affordable Care Act were 
careful not to directly conscript state legislatures or state officials to 
enforce the individual mandate. Id.  
69 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (citing a series of 
precedents supporting the constitutionality of conditional spending and 
federal preemption). 
70 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
71 485 U.S. 505 (1988). 
72 See Condon, 528 U.S. at 150-51 (“Such ‘commandeering’ is, however, an 
inevitable consequence of regulating a state activity. Any federal 
regulation demands compliance. That a State wishing to engage in 
certain activity must take administrative and sometimes legislative 
action to comply with federal standards regulating that activity is a 
commonplace that presents no constitutional defect.”) (quoting South 
Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 515 (1988)). 
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the “day-to-day responsibility for administering its complex 
provisions.”73 Nevertheless, the Court held that the state 
regulation did not qualify as commandeering because the 
regulation did not seek to control the manner in which state 
officials regulated private parties.74 Condon effectively 
limited the scope of New York and Printz to laws and 
regulations that directly conscript states or state officials to 
carry out federal orders.75 Simply burdening state officials 
with the day-to-day work of compliance is insufficient 
grounds for a Tenth Amendment claim.76  
 
B. The emergence of the equal sovereignty 
doctrine. 
 
The doctrine of equal sovereignty emerged out of dicta from 
Nw. Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder77 and was 
implemented in Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder.78 Prior principles 
supporting equal sovereignty are scattered throughout the 
Constitution. Article I, § 8, cl. 1 requires uniformity in duties 
and imposts.79 Article I, § 9, cl. 6 requires uniformity in 
regulation of state ports to prevent economic advantages 
between states.80 Article IV, § 2, cl. 1 prevents states from 
discriminating against citizens of other states, granting 
citizens the right to freely travel among states with the full 
legal rights of in-state residents.81 Additionally, the Supreme 
Court held that equal sovereignty was an essential principle 
                                               
73 Id. at 150.  
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 150-51. 
76 Id. 
77557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009). 
78133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).   
79 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
80 Id., § 9, cl. 6. 
81 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. (The Privileges and Immunities Clause). 
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when admitting new states to the Union.82 Later, in State of 
S.C. v. Katzenbach,83 the Court distinguished Coyle, holding 
that equal sovereignty only applied to the admittance of new 
states.84  
In 2013, Shelby Cty. overruled Katzenbach, finding § 
4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 196585 to be unconstitutional 
under the doctrine of equal sovereignty.86 Citing dicta from 
Coyle, United States v. Louisiana,87 and Northwest Austin, 
the Court concluded that equal sovereignty was a 
longstanding constitutional principle.88 While Shelby Cty. 
presented equal sovereignty as an established state right, the 
breadth of this holding has been questioned.89 First, Shelby 
Cty. was a five to four decision.90 Second, the holding in 
Shelby Cty. limited the scope of a longstanding statute 
designed to prevent voter discrimination, which is politically 
controversial.91 Third, the principle of equal sovereignty has 
yet to be extended to matters beyond the admittance of new 
                                               
82 See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911) (holding that U.S. CONST. 
art. 4, § 3 specifically grants equal sovereignty to newly admitted states). 
83 383 U.S. 301 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. 
Ct. 2612 (2013). 
84 Id. at 329. 
85 52 U.S.C. § 10101 (2012). 
86 133 S. Ct. at 2623-24. 
87 382 U.S. 288 (1965). 
88 See 133 S. Ct. at 2623-24 (“[T]he constitutional equality of the States is 
essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the 
Republic was organized.”) (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 
(1911)). 
89 See, e.g., Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 239 (3d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing 
Shelby Cty.’s equal sovereignty holding from PASPA on several grounds). 
90 Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631. 
91 See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2632-35; 2640-41 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (citing several modern, “second-generation barriers” to 
minority voting and factual examples of racially-motivated voting 
procedures that were blocked by the reauthorization of the VRA’s 
preclearance requirement in 2006). 
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states and voting rights.92 In Christie I, the Third Circuit 
addressed the equal sovereignty concerns of PASPA,93 but 
elected not to extend Shelby Cty.’s holding.94 The Christie I 
court explained, “there is nothing in Shelby County to 
indicate that the equal sovereignty principle is meant to 
apply with the same force outside the context of ‘sensitive 
areas of state and local policymaking.’”95  
 The Third Circuit also indicated that New Jersey 
incorrectly applied the principle of equal sovereignty.96 “It is 
noteworthy that Appellants do not ask us to invalidate § 
3704(a)(2), the Nevada grandfathering provision that 
supposedly creates the equal sovereignty problem.”97 While 
statutory grandfather clauses have been held 
constitutional,98 prior cases did not address grandfather 
clauses that specifically granted rights to certain states while 
prohibiting those rights from the other states.99 The 
emergence of the equal sovereignty doctrine indicates that 
the specific type of grandfather clause utilized in PASPA 
could have constitutional problems.100   
 
                                               
92 See Christie I, 730 F.3d at 239. 
93 Id. at 237-39. 
94 Id. at 239. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456 (1981); see also 
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). 
99 Compare Christie I, 730 F.3d at 239 (analyzing the constitutionality of 
a grandfather clause that discriminates between the legal rights of states) 
with Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 471 (upholding the 
constitutionality of a grandfather clause affecting the legal rights of 
private businesses with residual effects on interstate commerce). 
100 See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct at 2624 ([A]s we made clear in Northwest 
Austin, the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty remains highly 
pertinent in assessing subsequent disparate treatment of States.”) (citing 
557 U.S., at 203, 129 S.Ct. 2504). 
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C. PASPA 
 
The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 
was enacted with rational basis101 under the Commerce 
Clause of the Constitution.102 Congress has long recognized a 
federal interest in regulating gambling.103 Specifically, 
Congress created PASPA to prevent the spread of sports 
gambling, while allowing a grandfather clause to protect 
state economies that already significantly relied on sports 
gambling.104 There was very little reaction to the law in 1992 
because states that prohibited sports gambling had no 
interest in authorizing it.105 In 1992, very few states 
authorized casino gambling, which was extremely limited 
outside of Nevada and New Jersey.106  
This began to change in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
when a wave of states began legalizing casino gambling.107 
The rapid growth of state-authorized casino gambling was 
largely a reactionary economic phenomenon.108 When new 
states legalized casino gambling, neighboring states’ 
                                               
101 New Jersey did not contest that PASPA met the rational basis test.  
The purpose of PASPA was to “stop the spread of state-sanctioned sports 
gambling.” Christie I, 730 F.3d at 239. 
102 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
103 See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding federal 
law prohibiting sales of lottery tickets as valid exercise of Government 
commerce power). 
104 See Christie I, 730 F.3d at 239. 
105 New Jersey and certain other states had the option to legalize sports 
gambling within one year of the enactment of PASPA, but elected to 
maintain state-law prohibitions.  PASPA, 28 U.S.C. § 3704 (2012).  
106 Various tribal casinos existed outside of state jurisdiction. Certain 
states also legalized riverboat casino and low stakes gambling parlors.  
George G. Fenich, A Chronology of Legal Gaming in the U.S., 3 GAMING 
RES. & REV. J. 65, 70-5 (1996). 
107 J. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law®: The Third Wave of Legal 
Gambling, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 361, 384-85 (2010). 
108 See id. 
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economies suffered as residents crossed borders to gamble at 
casinos.109 In response, states traditionally opposed to casino 
gambling began legalizing gambling to counteract money lost 
to neighboring states.110 As a result, New Jersey’s casino 
income was devastated by emerging casinos in West Virginia, 
Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and eventually New 
York.111 This recent development made PASPA relevant as 
New Jersey scrambled to revive its struggling gaming 
economy.112  
 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
 
In Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, the Supreme 
Court held that PASPA violated the anti-commandeering 
doctrine under the Tenth Amendment.113 Further, the Court 
held that § 3702(1) was not severable from PASPA, 
effectively removing all federal prohibitions on sports 
gambling.114 The majority interpreted PASPA’s ban on any 
new authorization as commandeering on the grounds that a 
state’s act of repealing old laws inherently authorizes the 
previously prohibited conduct from those laws.115 “[S]tate 
‘authorization’ makes sense only against the backdrop of 
prohibition or regulation[,]” and thus the Court reasoned that 
                                               
109 See id. 
110 See id. at 186 (describing the domino effect of state authorized 
gambling). 
111 See Atlantic City Gaming Revenue: Annual Statistics for Total, Slot, 
Table, & Internet Win, 1978-2016, UNLV CENTER FOR GAMING 
RESEARCH, 1, 2 (Jan. 2017), http://gaming.unlv.edu/reports/ac_hist.pdf 
(showing declining revenues in Atlantic City casinos from 2007 through 
2015). 
112 N.J. STAT. ANN. 5:12A-7 (2014), invalidated by NCAA v. Governor of 
N.J., 832 F.3d 389, 402 (3d Cir. 2016). 
113 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1474 (2018). 
114 Id. at 1483-84. 
115 Id. at 1474. 
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a state cannot prohibit authorization without prohibiting 
repeal.116 
 Despite the government’s claim that “a statute should 
not be held unconstitutional if there is any reasonable 
interpretation can save it[,]”117 the Court determined that no 
interpretation could save PASPA.118 The majority then 
presented a structural argument for the importance of the 
Tenth Amendment and the history of the anti-
commandeering doctrine, concluding that the anti-
commandeering is important to (1) prevent tyranny, by 
balancing powers between the national and state 
government; (2) promote political accountability by making 
Congress accountable for its own regulations; and (3) to 
“prevent[] Congress from shifting the cost of regulations to 
the states.”119 
 The Court then stated that PASPA violated the anti-
commandeering doctrine by “unequivocally dictat[ing] what 
a state legislature may and may not do.”120 The majority 
further distinguished other preemption cases to show that 
those cases did not directly commandeer state legislative 
processes.121 The Court concluded the preemption discussion 
by stating, “regardless of the language sometimes used by 
Congress and this Court, every form of preemption is based 
on a federal law that regulates the conduct of private actors, 
not the States.”122 
 Throughout this analysis, the majority firmly 
abrogated § 3702(1) of PASPA for regulating the conduct of 
                                               
116 Id. 
117 See id. at 1475 (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.Ct. 830, 841-42 
(2018)).  
118 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478-79. 
119 Id. at 1475-77. 
120 Id. at 1478. 
121 Id. at 1479. 
122 Id. at 1481. 
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the states.123 The more controversial and impactful aspect of 
this decision followed with the Court’s subsequent analysis 
of the severability of § 3702(2), restricting private conduct.124 
The majority reasoned that Congress would not have wanted 
§ 3702(2) to remain if § 3702(1) was abrogated because § 
3702(1) and § 3702(2) were meant to work in tandem.125 The 
Court explained that § 3702(1) existed to enable a lawsuit 
against the state, while § 3702(2) existed for potential suits 
against private actors for the same goal of preventing state 
legalization of sports gambling.126 Accordingly, the Court 
concluded that § 3702(2) must also be stricken as well as 
PASPA’s provisions prohibiting the advertising of sports 
gambling.127 
 In the dissent, Justice Ginsburg took the opposite 
approach, stating “[n]othing in these § 3702(1) and § 
3702(2) prohibitions commands States to do anything other 
than desist from conduct federal law proscribes.”128 The 
dissent further attacked the majority’s severability decision 
by highlighting its unusual divergence from the ordinary 
approach of only severing problematic portions, while leaving 
the statute intact.129 The dissent concluded by attacking the 
majority’s assumptions about congressional intent, arguing 
that Congress intended to stop sports gambling regimes and 
there was no rational basis to conclude Congress would have 
preferred no statute versus allowing § 3702(2) to remain.130  
 Justice Breyer, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part, elaborated on the issue of severability, contending that 
§ 3702(2) did not intend to work in tandem with § 3702(1), 
                                               
123 Id. 
124 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1481. 
125 Id. at 1482-83. 
126 Id. at 1483. 
127 Id. at 1483-84. 
128 Id. at 1489 (Ginsberg, J. dissenting). 
129 Id. at 1489. 
130 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1490. 
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but was rather a safety net against the potential severability 
of § 3702(1).131 Additionally, Justice Thomas added a 
concurring opinion, which warned the Court against its 
recent approach to severability, which in his belief, impedes 
on longstanding limitations on judicial power.132 
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision to overturn PASPA under the 
anti-commandeering doctrine likely will have minimal 
precedential value, yet enormous effects on the sports and 
gambling industries.133 PASPA was drafted in an extremely 
unusual manner134 and this decision, like prior anti-
commandeering decisions, will serve to eliminate this 
particular method of drafting.135 Whether the Court decided 
this case correctly, depends heavily on the interpretation of 
the word “authorization.”136  
                                               
131 See id. at 1488 (Breyer, concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“The first says that a State cannot authorize sports gambling schemes 
under state law; the second says that (just in case a State finds a way to 
do so) sports gambling schemes that a State authorizes are unlawful 
under federal law regardless.”).  
132 See id. at 1485-87 (Thomas, J. concurring).  Justice Thomas’s strongly 
admonished the Court’s recent approach to severability, yet declined to 
dissent in this case, citing that neither party asked the Court to 
reconsider the severability precedents. Id. at 1487. 
133 See infra Part IV.A.1. 
134 See PASPA, 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (prohibiting governmental entities 
from authorizing sports gambling by law, rather than outright 
prohibiting sports gambling as conduct).  
135 Since New York, Congress cannot draft a statute conscripting state 
governments to enforce federal regulations. 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992). 
Since Printz, Congress cannot draft statutes that conscript state officials 
to enforce federal regulations. 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). After Murphy, 
Congress can no longer draft statutes that appear to prohibit states from 
repealing or modifying their own laws. 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1474 (2018). 
136 Writing for the majority, Justice Alito determined that authorization 
could only possibly be considered in the context of existing prohibitions 
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The Court overstepped its bounds by striking down 
PASPA rather than merely severing § 3702(1).137 The 
majority’s assumptions about whether Congress would have 
wanted PASPA to remain if § 3702(1) was stricken were quite 
speculative.138 A deeper look into the history of PASPA and 
the reasoning behind the strange drafting of this statute 
reveals that the majority’s assumptions about the intent of 
Congress in 1992 were likely mistaken.139  
Further, the anti-commandeering doctrine cannot 
resolve the issue of whether Congress should be able to 
prohibit conduct in some states while allowing it in others.140 
The Constitutional question regarding statutes that 
discriminate between states’ rights will likely need to be 
addressed by the Court, as neighboring states compete in a 
race-to-the-bottom to legalize gambling, marijuana, and 
other future conduct.141 States are approaching a unique 
                                               
and therefore a bar on state authorization was effectively a bar on 
repealing existing state laws. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1474. Writing for the 
dissent, Justice Ginsburg concluded that PASPA does nothing more than 
command states to “desist from conduct federal law proscribes.” Id. at 
1489 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
137 Id. at 1489 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (“When a statute reveals a 
constitutional flaw, the Court ordinarily engages in a salvage rather than 
a demolition operation . . . .”). 
138 See id. at 1482-1484 (majority opinion) (engaging in a series of if-then 
inquiries into what Congress would have wanted if it had known that § 
3702(1) was invalidated). 
139 See id. at 1488 (Breyer, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(citing S. REP. No. 102–248, at 4–6 (1991)) (explaining that the “obvious” 
purpose of PASPA was to “keep sports gambling from spreading[]” and 
Congress could have created § 3702(2) as a “backup, called into play is 
subsection (1)’s requirements, directed to the States, turned out to be 
unconstitutional—which, of course, is what happened.”). 
140 See infra Part IV.C.1. 
141 See, e.g., Lucy Dadayan, The Blinken Report: State Revenues from 
Gambling: Short-Term Relief, Long-Term Disappointment, THE NELSON 
A. ROCKEFELLER INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT I, at 2 (April, 2016) 
(indicating that between 1990 and 2015, the number of states authorizing 
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crisis, where economic interests conflict with traditional 
state social welfare interests.142 The Supreme Court did not 
address equal sovereignty in the current case because that 
argument was rejected by the Third Circuit in Christie I and 
certiorari was denied.143    
Section IV.A analyzes the impact of Murphy on the 
scope of the anti-commandeering doctrine. Section IV.B 
criticizes the Court’s application of the severability doctrine 
to invalidate all of PASPA and questions the Court’s “political 
accountability” justification for its decision to abrogate 
PASPA under anti-commandeering.  Section IV.C explains 
why laws like PASPA should be addressed under the equal 
sovereignty principle and assesses the future impact of the 
Court’s decision in Murphy.  
 
A. Did the Court expand the anti-
commandeering doctrine to include inaction 
or merely require Congress to draft more 
carefully?     
 
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito determined that state 
authorization is a concept that could “make sense only 
against a backdrop of prohibition or regulation.”144 The 
opinion also discussed the history of anti-commandeering 
                                               
casino gambling increased from two to seventeen); see also Joseph 
MisuIonas, These Charts Show the Evolution of America’s Marijuana 
Laws Over Time, CIVILIZED (Aug. 31, 2017), http://www.civilized. 
life/articles/evolution-america-marijuana-laws-charts/ (displaying the 
rapid growth of legalized marijuana; since 1996, 28 states legalized 
medical marijuana with eight states legalizing recreational marijuana). 
142 See Dadayan, supra note 141, at 5 (citing efforts to counteract 
interstate competition for gambling revenue as a purpose for why states 
legalize gambling). 
143 Christie v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (mem.) 
(2014). 
144 Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 146, 1474 (2018). 
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and concluded that the three most significant justifications 
for the anti-commandeering principle were: protection of 
liberty, political accountability, and prevention of cost-
shifting to the states.145 Subsequently, the Court decided that 
prohibiting state authorization of sports gambling violated 
the anti-commandeering rule.146   
“The provision unequivocally dictates what a state 
legislature may and may not do.  And this is true under either 
our interpretation or that advocated by respondents and the 
United States.”147 
This statement subtly expands the anti-
commandeering doctrine to include inactions.148  Previously, 
the anti-commandeering doctrine only applied when federal 
law conscripted state governments or state officials to take a 
positive action.149 Yet, how can the anti-commandeering 
doctrine prevent Congress from making laws prohibiting 
conduct within the states when the Supremacy Clause 
dictates that federal law is the supreme law of the land?150 
The Court answers this question, quoting New York: “the 
Constitution ‘confers upon Congress the power to regulate 
individuals, not States[.]’”151 
Based on the Murphy Court’s interpretation, this 
means that states can authorize any type of conduct, simply 
because Congress lacks the power to regulate the states.152 
In reality, these authorizations should be meaningless 
because Congress still has the authority to prohibit people 
from engaging in state-authorized conduct that is preempted 
                                               
145 Id. at 1477. 
146 Id. at 1478. 
147 Id. 
148 See id. (holding PASPA invalid under the anti-commandeering 
doctrine for dictating what a state legislature “may not do.”). 
149 See infra Part II.A. 
150 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
151 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 166). 
152 C.f. id. 
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by federal law.153 Therefore, the prohibition of sports 
gambling on private businesses and individuals is entirely 
permissible under the Supremacy Clause and the anti-
commandeering doctrine.154 This is exactly what PASPA did 
in § 3702(2); thus the Court’s decision in Murphy is quite 
puzzling and even more bizarre as applied to severability.155 
A logical interpretation of Murphy would lead to a conclusion 
that the anti-commandeering doctrine was not significantly 
expanded and PASPA might have remained intact if 
Congress had never confused the Court by separately 
regulating the states in § 3702(1).156 
 
B. The Court’s application of the severability 
doctrine was severely misguided, creating 
an instance of extreme judicial legislation in 
defiance of the principle of political 
accountability. 
 
Quoting the Senate Report, Justice Breyer explained 
Congress’s purpose for PASPA by stating, “[t]he obvious 
answer is that Congress wanted to ‘keep sports gambling 
from spreading.’”157 To accomplish that goal, Congress 
employed unusual drafting language intended to only 
prohibit sports gambling in states that had not already 
                                               
153 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476 
(explaining preemption, stating “when federal and state law conflict, 
federal law prevails and state law is preempted”). 
154 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
155 28 U.S.C. § 3702(2) (2012). 
156 The Court’s fragile severability analysis rests on the assumption that 
§ 3702(2) of PASPA is meant to support § 3702(1), rather than act as its 
own independent provision. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1474-1485. 
157 Id. at 1488 (Breyer, J. concurring in part dissenting in part) (quoting 
S. REP. No. 102–248, at 4–6 (1991)). 
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authorized sports gambling.158 The Supreme Court’s decision 
to invalidate all of PASPA, based on highly speculative 
statutory interpretation is quite troubling, especially when 
actual legislative intent was available and discussed in 
dissenting opinions.159 Part 1 discredits the Court’s 
severability analysis. Part 2 questions whether the Court’s 
decision in Murphy actually furthered political 
accountability and suggests that accountability needs to be 
addressed under a different area of law. 
 
1. The Court’s severability analysis rested on the 
false assumption that § 3702(2) of PASPA could 
not or was not intended to preempt all potential 
state authorizations of sports gambling. 
 
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg accurately described the 
majority’s reasoning as a “plain error [that] pervasively 
infects the Court’s severability analysis.”160 The modern 
severability test asks “‘[w]ould Congress still have passed’ 
the valid sections ‘had it known’ about the constitutional 
invalidity of the other portions of the statute?”161 This 
requires the Court to make an inquiry into statutory 
intent.162 The error in the Court’s severability analysis is 
                                               
158 See 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (prohibiting states from authorizing sports 
gambling, implicitly allowing states that had already authorized sports 
gambling to continue legal operations); Id. § 3704 (explicitly 
grandfathering in states with existing legal gambling schemes and 
allowing a one-year window for states with existing casino gambling to 
authorize sports gambling). 
159 See generally S. REP. No. 102–248 (1991); see also Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 
at 1488-90. 
160 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1490 (2018) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
161 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005) (quoting Denver 
Area Ed. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 767 (1996) 
(plurality opinion). 
162 See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1486 (Thomas, J. concurring). 
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clear from the first inquiry: “If Congress had known that 
States would be free to authorize sports gambling in privately 
owned casinos, would it have nevertheless wanted to prevent 
States from running sports lotteries?”163 The Court 
adequately concluded that it would have been odd to allow 
sports gambling in casinos, but not in state lotteries,164 but 
failed to explain why it is assumed sports gambling in casinos 
would not still be prohibited under § 3702(2).165 Next, the 
Court wrongly concluded that Congress would not want to 
ban sports gambling as private conduct if it were authorized 
by state law.166 Both of these conclusions rested on the false 
assumptions that § 3702(2) of PASPA would not preempt 
state laws authorizing sports wagering or Congress did not 
intend § 3702(2) to be interpreted that way.167 § 3702(2) 
regulated private conduct, which is entirely permissible 
under the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses.168 Therefore, 
the Court employed circular reasoning to invalidate § 
3702(2), based off a false assumption that § 3702(2)’s 
prohibitions on private conduct would not preempt any laws 
created by states authorizing sports gambling.169   
It is puzzling to consider how the Court managed to 
reach its conclusion. Perhaps, if Congress had merely 
reversed the order of §§ 3702(1) and 3702(2) of PASPA, first 
                                               
163 Id. at 1482 (majority opinion). 
164 See id at 1482-83 (highlighting the irregularity of a statute that would 
ban sports gambling through lotteries but allow it in casinos, when lottery 
betting is generally considered more benign than heavier wagering in 
casinos). 
165 See id. at 1488 (Breyer, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(suggesting that § 3702(2) acted as a failsafe to prohibit sports gambling, 
regardless of whether § 3702(1) remained intact). 
166 Id. at 1483 (majority opinion) (citing the history of the federal 
approach to gambling, which historically only violated federal law under 
18 U.S.C. 1953 when gambling was also prohibited under state law).  
167 See id. at 1483-84. 
168 Id. at 1488 (Breyer, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
169 See supra notes 150-153 and accompanying text. 
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prohibiting sports gambling as private conduct, and then 
barring state authorization as a corollary, the statute would 
have been ruled lawful under ordinary federal preemption.170 
This reveals the crucial flaw in the Court’s severability 
analysis because the Court’s methodology would also allow 
any state authorization of private conduct to override a 
federal preemption, contradicting the Supremacy Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution.171 
 
2. The Court’s holding allowed Congress to 
further avoid political accountability. 
 
In Murphy, the Court emphasized the value of political 
accountability and concluded the opinion stating “the choice 
is not ours to make.”172 In reality, the Supreme Court, rather 
than Congress, will be accountable for the legalization of 
sports gambling across America.173 The issue of 
accountability exposes the crucial flaw of PASPA from its 
very onset.174 Congress intended to prevent the spread of 
sports gambling, but also wanted to avoid accountability for 
economic harm of shutting down existing sports gambling 
                                               
170 See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1488 (Breyer, J. concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“The first says that a State cannot authorize sports 
gambling schemes under state law; the second says that (just in case a 
State finds a way to do so) sports gambling schemes that a State 
authorizes are unlawful under federal law regardless.”). 
171 See supra notes 150-153 and accompanying text. 
172 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484 (2018). 
173 See Herb Jackson, Sports Betting: Congress May try to Regulate, but 
Passage of any Legislation is a Long Shot, USA TODAY NETWORK (May 
15, 2018, 11:19 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/ 
2018/05/15/sports-betting-congress-may-try-new-regulations-but-odds-
high/609817002/. 
174 PASPA was drafted intentionally to avoid political accountability by 
allowing states that permitted sports gambling in 1991 to continue lawful 
operations, while prohibiting future authorization in states with existing 
laws barring sports gambling.  28 U.S.C. §§ 3702-3704 (2012). 
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enterprises.175 By simply stating no state may authorize 
sports gambling and incorporating a grandfather clause, 
Congress avoided all accountability—sports gambling 
remained illegal in states that did not want it, while it 
remained legal in states with existing schemes.176 This 
allowed Congress to mitigate the harmful effects of sports 
gambling without incurring the blame of the harmful 
economic effects of shutting down existing sports gambling 
enterprises.177 Murphy does not solve this issue of 
accountability; Murphy merely prevents Congress from 
prohibiting a state governmental entity from creating a 
particular law authorizing unwanted conduct.178 Congress 
can still draft laws prohibiting the actual conduct, while 
exempting states with laws already allowing such conduct.179 
Therefore, Congress could still draft a law identical to PASPA 
in effects.180 
Like most anti-commandeering cases, Murphy should 
not have significant precedential impact, but rather require 
Congress to draft more carefully in the future.181 The Court 
                                               
175 See, e.g., S. REP. 102-248 at 8 (1992) (“Although the committee firmly 
believes that all such sports gambling is harmful, it has no wish to apply 
this new prohibition retroactively to Oregon or Delaware, which 
instituted sports lotteries prior to the introduction of our legislation. 
Neither has the committee any desire to threaten the economy of Nevada, 
which over many decades has come to depend on legalized private 
gambling, including sports gambling, as an essential industry, or to 
prohibit lawful sports gambling schemes in other States that were in 
operation when the legislation was introduced.”).  
176 See PASPA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3702-3704. 
177 See supra note 175. 
178 Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1481 (2018). 
179 C.f. id. 
180 C.f. id. 
181 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 145 (1992) (preventing 
Congress from drafting future laws directing state governments to carry 
out federal regulations); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 
935 (1997) (preventing Congress from drafting future laws directing state 
officials to carry out federal regulations). 
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declined to address the core issue with PASPA—whether 
Congress can enact laws that prohibit conduct in some states, 
while allowing it in others.182 The Third Circuit addressed 
this under the doctrine of equal sovereignty of the states in 
Christie I, but rejected New Jersey’s claim and the Supreme 
Court’s denied certiorari on that issue.183  Likely, the impact 
of a federal statute that discriminates among states must 
eventually be addressed by the Supreme Court.184 
 
C. Interstate economic competition is affecting 
state laws across the country, which may 
cause Congress to impose new models of 
PASPA, which will need to be addressed 
under equal sovereignty.  
 
When PASPA was passed, New Jersey could not foresee the 
loss of its casino gambling revenues resulting from casino 
legalization in neighboring states.185 Pennsylvania and West 
Virginia could not have predicted the Great Recession and 
the steep decline of the coal and steel industries, leading for 
the need for new revenue sources.186 Maryland could not have 
foreseen the emergence of casinos along its northern, eastern, 
and western borders.187 States have competing economic 
                                               
182 See infra note 183 and accompanying text. 
183 See Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 238-39 (3d Cir. 2013) (rejecting the 
appellants’ equal sovereignty argument and holding that the principle of 
equal sovereignty was meant to apply on the narrow grounds of “sensitive 
areas of state and local policymaking.”) (quoting Shelby Cty., Ala. v. 
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624 (2013)). 
184 See infra Part IV. C. 
185 See Dadayan, supra note 141, at 5-7 (analyzing the rapid expansion of 
legalized gambling on the East Coast in the last fifteen years). 
186 See id. at 6 (explaining the effects of the Great Recession, incentivizing 
states to legalize gambling to help balance budgets and curb declining tax 
revenues). 
187 See id. at 5 (highlighting states’ incentives to legalize gambling to 
“counteract interstate competition for gambling revenue.”). 
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interests and these interests are dynamic.188 New Jersey’s 
decision to legalize sports gambling was a direct reaction to 
the decline of its Atlantic City casinos, resulting from casino 
legalization in neighboring states.189  
Laws like PASPA leave state economies defenseless 
against the economic impact of neighboring states’ 
legalization of gambling, marijuana, prostitution, and other 
future laws that create interstate competition.190 PASPA’s 
invalidation remedied this issue as applied to sports 
gambling, but did nothing to prevent future laws from being 
created in the exact same manner, so long as the drafters 
direct prohibitions at conduct rather than the state 
authorization of such conduct.191 Part 1 explains how 
interstate economic competition may lead to future laws like 
PASPA, which will need to be addressed under equal 
sovereignty, rather than anti-commandeering. Part 2 
assesses the direct effects of Murphy and warns against the 
judicial legislation. 
 
1. A wave of legalization of formerly prohibited 
conduct is rippling through the states. 
 
Current trends shows that states cannot properly protect 
residents from perceived threats192 to social welfare when 
                                               
188 See id. at 5-6. 
189 See N.J.S.A. 5:12A-1 (2011) (citing the critical challenges that 
jeopardize New Jersey’s casinos as an important backbone of the state 
economy and the need to change the regulatory rules to compete in “an 
ever-expanding national gaming market.”). 
190 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
191 See supra notes 150-153 and accompanying text.  
192 This Article does not intend to take a stance on the social welfare value 
of laws prohibiting certain private conduct, but rather intends to 
highlight a current economic issue where states are changing laws 
designed to police conduct in reaction to external economic forces.   
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those threats are in close vicinity, across state borders.193 In 
casino gambling, data showed that propagation of casinos 
ultimately had negative effects on the economy of the 
states.194 State economies benefit when a large portion of 
these revenues are funded by residents of neighboring 
states.195 In situations of “border hugging,” neighboring 
states face a dilemma: if the state legalizes gambling, then 
its residents and its economy will suffer long-term negative 
effects.196 If the state elects to keep gambling illegal, then the 
state will suffer these same consequences, but the revenue 
recouped by the casinos is captured by neighboring states.197 
As a result, the majority of states legalized gambling, 
accepting the inevitable societal cost in order to reap the 
consolation benefit of state casino revenues.198 Equilibrium 
                                               
193 See Jamisen Etzel, The House of Cards is Falling: Why States Should 
Cooperate on Legal Gambling, 15 N.Y.U. J. OF LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 
201 (2012) (documenting the race-to-the-bottom forcing states to change 
their laws in response to legislation from neighboring states). 
194 See id. at 215-22 (explaining the diminishing and ultimately negative 
economic returns from the saturation of casino gambling, resulting in an 
equilibrium where states can no longer benefit from tourism revenue, 
leading to shrinking economies from residents’ direct losses, businesses 
being displaced by casinos, and portions of casino revenue being diverted 
out-of-state to corporate employees and shareholders).  
195 States cannot grow their economies simply by siphoning income from 
their own residents—gambling income has always been funded by 
tourism. See id. at 224 (noting over a billion dollar decline in Atlantic 
City’s gross revenues, since Pennsylvania legalized casino gambling); see 
also Dadayan, supra note 141, at 32 (Appendix Table 8) (showing revenue 
declines in older casino states as new states legalized casino gambling). 
196 Etzel, supra note 193 at 235-37. 
197 Etzel compares this situation to the classic “prisoner’s dilemma.” See 
id. at 214-15; 235-36. 
198 See Dadayan, supra note 141 at 31 (Appendix Tables 7) (showing the 
rapid growth of state-authorized casino gambling from 1990 to 2010); see 
also Etzel, supra note 193, at 236 (explaining how border-hugging casinos 
benefit by exporting costs, by gaining revenues from out-of-state 
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occurs when money can no longer be extracted from out-of-
state residents; at this point, all the states suffer the social 
and economic consequences.199 The cycle begins once again, 
when a new law is created authorizing another formerly-
prohibited conduct.200  
This pattern is exemplified by the facts surrounding 
the current case.201 New Jersey lost its casino gambling 
tourism income after neighboring states reacted and 
adjusted to New Jersey’s economic advantage.202 New Jersey 
attempted to reclaim some of that advantage by authorizing 
sports gambling.203 In the short-term, the first state to 
authorize conduct reaps the benefits of tourism income, until 
neighboring states react, leading to diminishing, and finally 
negative returns.204 Unfettered, this pattern can lead to a 
long cycle of decay. 
PASPA intended to stop the spread of sports gambling, 
while protecting Nevada’s economy, which relies heavily on 
the gambling industry.205 Regardless of Congress’s 
                                               
residents, but also unintentionally influence the neighboring states to 
change their laws to counteract this gain). 
199 These consequences include loss of productivity, displacement of 
demand for other goods, a decline in local business, regulatory capture 
resulting from state competition to lure gamblers, and increases in 
gambling addiction.  Etzel, supra note 193, at 214, 228. 
200 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1702 (PASPA); see also Etzel, supra note 193, at 
229 (citing a Nevada industry campaign to reduce the gambling age from 
21 to 18, following the Great Recession and Indiana’s recent amendment 
to remove the requirement that riverboat casinos operate on water). 
201 See supra Part I.  
202 See Etzel, supra note 193, at 207 (“Pennsylvania politicians were 
extremely cognizant of the capital outflow caused by Atlantic City casinos 
and repeatedly went on record to claim that legalization was needed to 
stop it.”). 
203 See N.J.S.A. 5:12A-1 et seq. (2011). 
204 See Etzel, supra note 193, at 219. 
205 See S. Rep. No. 102-248, at 8 (“Although the committee firmly believes 
that all such sports gambling is harmful, it has no wish to apply this new 
prohibition retroactively to Oregon or Delaware, which instituted sports 
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intentions, laws must not be structured in this manner.206 
Discriminatory federal law-making precludes state 
legislatures from defending against neighboring states’ 
attempts to extract money via tourism revenue.207 Although, 
states’ defensive legislation may cause a greater overall 
harm,208 it would be more unjust to federally authorize 
certain states to exploit the economies of others.209 Given this 
lose-lose situation, future protection of residents’ social 
welfare likely will fall further into the hands of the Federal 
Government.210 The Court’s decision in Murphy will likely 
expose this issue by creating a new race-to-the-bottom for 
sports gambling.211 Until the Court readdresses the issue of 
equal sovereignty from Christie I, the door remains open for 
                                               
lotteries prior to the introduction of our legislation. Neither has the 
committee any desire to threaten the economy of Nevada, which over 
many decades has come to depend on legalized private gambling, 
including sports gambling. . . . ”). 
206 PASPA effectively grants a monopoly on a particular industry to three 
states. See id. 
207 C.f. Etzel, supra note 193, at 220 (“[S]tate leaders believe that if their 
residents are already gambling, it is better that they gamble within the 
home state than anywhere else. That is, if a state is already incurring 
costs from gambling, it might end up with a better bargain by legalizing 
and realizing benefits.”). 
208 See id. at 232 (explaining that once an equilibrium is reached where 
states are mostly only serving their own residents, revenue influx from 
legalized gambling erodes, while socio-economic problems incur). 
209 See Ryan M. Rodenberg & John T. Holden, Sports Betting & Equal 
Sovereignty, 67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 1, 12 (2017) (discussing Senator 
Grassley’s proposed amendment to end the PASPA grandfather clause, 
citing multiple senators’ discontent with PASPA’s discriminatory 
nature).   
210 See Etzel, supra note 193, at 245 (“Only the federal government is 
capable of creating a consistent regulatory approach that is all 
encompassing and based on a single set of objectives.”). 
211 See infra Part IV.C.2. 
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Congress to make new “stop the spread” laws, discriminating 
and disadvantaging certain states.212 
 
2. The Court’s decision in Murphy has directly 
sparked another race-to-the-bottom between 
states to legalize sports gambling. 
  
“[C]ustomers can’t wait to begin wagering on sports . . . [t]his 
region is a hotbed of both professional sports and college 
athletics, and we look forward to becoming a destination for 
fans in West Virginia, Virginia, Maryland, and Washington, 
D.C.,” said Scott Saunders, General Manager at Hollywood 
Casino in Charles Town, West Virginia.213 Intense 
advertising campaigns have already begun, targeting the 
dense population of the Washington D.C. suburbs, which is 
strikingly reminiscent of the advertising campaigns in the 
early 2000s, which led to the domino effect legalization of 
casinos across Mid-Atlantic States.214 This time around, 
many states learned their lesson and are reacting much 
faster in response to neighboring competition.215 New Jersey, 
West Virginia, Delaware, and Mississippi swiftly integrated 
                                               
212 See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 
208, 239 (3d Cir. 2013), abrogated by Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) (characterizing PASPA’s policy of 
“[t]argeting only states where [sports gambling] did not exist” as a 
rational means to stop the spread of sports gambling). 
213 Drew Hanson, Sports Betting is Coming to Charles Town. Will it 
Impact Maryland's Casinos?, WASH. BUS. J., (Aug. 20, 2018, 8:45 PM), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/washington/news/2018/08/20/sports-
betting-is-coming-to-charles-town-how-will.html. 
214 See supra Part IV.C.1. 
215 Ryan Rodenberg, State-by-State Sports Betting Bill Tracker, ESPN, 
(last updated Sept. 19, 2018), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/ 
_/id/19740480/gambling-sports-betting-bill-tracker-all-50-states 
(documenting twenty-seven states that have either legalized sports 
gambling or are in the process of trying to legalize it).  
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full scale sports gambling operations at licensed casinos.216 
Additionally, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island 
have recently passed bills legalizing sports gambling.217 
Other states such as Maryland, Virginia, and the District of 
Columbia are again suffering the consequences of lagging 
behind in this financial footrace.218 Maryland attempted to 
pass a bill calling for a referendum on sports gambling, which 
passed in the House of Delegates by an overwhelming 124-14 
vote.219 However, the bill stymied in the Senate, due to 
questions of whether sports gambling should be allowed only 
in casinos or also at racetracks.220  
Perhaps there is not as great a sense of urgency 
regarding sports gambling because sports gambling 
encompasses a much smaller market than casino gambling 
as a whole.221 Nevertheless, the competitive advantage of 
drawing customers from neighboring states is significant 
enough to change state laws throughout the country.222 This 
                                               
216 Id.  
217 Id. 
218 Matt Bonesteel, Legal Sports Gambling Inches Closer to the DMV as 
Charles Town Readies Sportsbook for Liftoff, D.C. Sports Bog, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/dc-sports-
bog/wp/2018/08/09/legal-sports-gambling-inches-closer-to-the-dmv-as-
charles-town-readies-sportsbook-for-liftoff/?noredirect=on&utm_term= 
.a6702b70ecef.  
219 H.D. 1014, 438th Sess. (Md. 2018). 
220 Opinion, With Supreme Court Sports Betting Decision, Maryland Will 
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BALT. SUN (May 14, 2018), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/ 
opinion/editorial/bs-ed-0515-sports-betting-20180514-story.html. 
221 Sports betting only makes up two percent of gaming revenue in 
Nevada.  Scott Dance, Maryland General Assembly Leaders Open to 
Special Session on Sports Betting, but Gov. Hogan is not, BALT. SUN (May 
15, 2018, 1:35 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland 
/politics/bs-md-sports-betting-session-20180515-story.html. 
222 See Rodenberg, supra note 215 (documenting the reactions of twenty-
seven states taking steps to legalize sports gambling within the first four 
months after the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy).  
 STIERS 
Journal of Business & Technology Law 167 
raises the question of whether states can realistically decide 
their own laws on issues that involve interstate economic 
competition.  
For context, imagine a small state surrounded by other 
states with casinos, marijuana dispensaries, and brothels 
located minutes from the state borders. Certainly, that state 
would be forced to legalize these same establishments or 
money would continue to pour across its borders, crippling 
the state economy.223 Further, if federal law could prohibit 
the small state from legalizing these establishments, the 
state would be powerless to protect its economy.224 Therefore, 
the federal government will need to intervene at some point, 
but it should not recreate discriminatory PASPA-like laws.225   
This reality leads back to a critical issue from 
Murphy—political accountability.226 Would Congress pass a 
law prohibiting a harmful activity if the prohibition damaged 
the economies of states already authorizing the activity?227 
After Murphy, Congress can no longer disguise 
discriminatory laws using phrases like “it shall be unlawful 
for a governmental entity to . . . authorize . . . ” a certain type 
of conduct—Congress would have to state directly that the 
conduct is now illegal, but also exempt the states that already 
legalized that conduct.228 For example, Congress could 
prohibit recreational marijuana use as conduct, and then 
exempt Alaska, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, the 
District of Columbia, Oregon, Washington.229 Such a law 
                                               
223 C.f. Etzel, supra note 193, at 236 (explaining the issue of border-
hugging). 
224 See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
225 See id. 
226 See Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1477 
(2018). 
227 See supra Part IV.B.2. 
228 See PASPA 28 U.S.C. § 3702. 
229 See id.; see also State Marijuana Laws in 2018 Map, GOVERNING: THE 
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would be entirely permissible under Murphy, but Congress 
might not want to expose itself to the scrutiny of a blatantly 
discriminatory statute.230 In this example, Congress would 
be forced to take accountability in the future: either (1) for 
shutting down recreational marijuana dispensaries and 
harming state economies231 or (2) for making a law that 
clearly discriminates among states.232 If employed, the 
second option should eventually be held unconstitutional—
certainly the Constitution did not intend to give the federal 
government the authority to decide which states can thrive 
and which states must suffer economic decline.233 
Nevertheless, it is still uncertain whether Congress 
would actually assume the political accountability for 
prohibiting potentially harmful conduct across all states 
when that conduct is legal and supported by industries in 
certain states.234 This particular accountability issue speaks 
more to the nature of a representative democracy than a 
discussion for the Court.235 In reality, the potential harm of 
                                               
data/safety-justice/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-
recreational.html. 
230 See supra notes 174-177 and accompanying text. 
231 See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
232 See Equal Sovereignty, supra Part II.B. 
233 The Privileges and Immunities Clause prohibits states from imposing 
laws preventing citizens from traveling to and engaging in lawful conduct 
in other states.  If states are federally prohibited from imposing the same 
laws on their own citizens, then those states could be subject to a severe 
and unresolvable competitive disadvantage, which runs contrary to the 
structure of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; see 
also infra Part II.B. 
234 See, e.g., S. REP. 102-248 at 8 (1992) (explicitly stating that Congress 
did not want PASPA to prohibit sports gambling in all of the states to 
avoid harming Nevada’s sports gambling industry). 
235 The question of whether Congress will or will not assume 
accountability for passing a statute is an issue of deference to the will of 
the people rather than an issue of allocating accountability between the 
federal and state governments. C.f. Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1477 (2018). 
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the conduct to be regulated is not as determinative as its 
popularity, although these factors are correlated.236 
Certainly, Congress could pass general prohibitions across 
the states, but will only assume accountability if the 
prohibitions gain sufficient popularity to outweigh the 
negative sentiment, associated with shutting down 
industries and cutting jobs.237   
If the Supreme Court invalidated the next PASPA-like 
law on equal sovereignty grounds, this would at least restore 
the natural structure of our democracy.238 The federal 
government could regulate issues stemming from interstate 
economic competition and ultimately those regulations would 
be decided by the people.239 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, the Court 
invalidated PASPA for violating the anti-commandeering 
doctrine under the Tenth Amendment.240 This decision is 
unsettling because the legal analysis was quite arbitrary, 
while the actual impact of the decision reshaped gambling 
laws across the country.241 Murphy was decided by a divided 
Court and grounded largely on uncertain statutory 
interpretation, relating to anti-commandeering and 
severability.242 The case failed to resolve PASPA’s crucial 
                                               
236 See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
237 The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203 provides an 
example of a federal regulation across all states that gained enough 
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240 Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1473-74 
(2018). 
241 See supra Part IV.B. 
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flaw because certiorari was granted for the wrong question of 
law.243 PASPA was invalidated, yet an effectively identical 
law could still be enacted.244 These issues will need to be 
reevaluated in the near future on equal sovereignty grounds.  
                                               
243 See supra Part IV.C. 
244 See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text. 
